operation of the Precautionary Principle is inextricably intertwined with social risk perceptions.
Nations can regard themselves as "precautionary" only if they blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a narrow subset of what is at stake.
That kind of self-blinding is what makes the Precautionary Principle seem to give guidance; and I shall have a fair bit to say about why people and societies are selective in their fears. My major hypothesis is that the availability heuristic is often the source of people's fears about certain risks. 7 If a particular incident is cognitively "available"-both vivid and salient-then people will have a heightened fear of the risk in question. If people in one nation fear the risks associated with terrorism, and people in another nation fear the risks associated with mad cow disease, the availability heuristic is likely to be the reason. Hence cultural differences, with respect to application of the precautionary principle, are often rooted in availability. But this point misses some complexities, about both social influences and cultural predispositions; I shall turn to these in due course. The availability heuristic does not operate in a social or cultural vacuum.
In short, I aim here both to show that the Precautionary Principle is not quite what it seems and that its operation is underwritten by an identifiable heuristic with social and cultural foundations. The result is a hypothesis, to the effect that cross-cultural differences in both risk perception and in precautions are produced, in large part, by availability. I shall not be able to prove that hypothesis in this space, but I hope to be able to say enough to prove that the hypothesis is plausible, illuminating, and worth further exploration.
Weak and Strong
Begin with the Precautionary Principle. 8 There are twenty or more definitions, and they are not compatible with one another. 9 We can imagine a continuum of understandings. At one extreme are weak versions to which no reasonable person could object. At the other extreme are strong versions that would require a fundamental rethinking of regulatory policy.
The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate. Controls might be justified even if we cannot establish a definite connection between, for example, lowlevel exposures to certain carcinogens and adverse effects on human health. Thus the 1992 Rio Declaration states, "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." 10 The Ministerial Declaration of the
Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, held in London in
1987, is in the same vein: "Accepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a Precautionary Principle is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence." 11 Similarly, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change offers cautious language:
"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost." 12 The widely publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of environmentalists in 1998, goes somewhat further: "When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the proponent of the activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof." 13 The first sentence just quoted is more aggressive than the Rio Declaration because it is not limited to threats of serious or irreversible damage. And in reversing the burden of proof, 10 Quoted in Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist 347 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 11 Quoted in Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 3, Julian Morris, ed. (Oxford: ButterworthHeinemann, 2000) . 12 See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle 6 (2001). 13 In Europe, the Precautionary Principle is sometimes understood in a still stronger way, suggesting that it is important to build "a margin of safety into all decision making." 14 According to one definition, the Precautionary Principle means "that action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm has already occurred." 15 The word "may" is the crucial one here. In a comparably strong version, it is said that "the Precautionary Principle mandates that when there is a risk of significant health or environmental damage to others or to future generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted unless and until scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur." 16 The words "will not occur" seem to require proponents of an activity to demonstrate that there is no risk at all-often an impossible burden to meet. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 2000, appears to adopt a strong version as well. 17 The Final Declaration of the First European "Seas At Risk" conference says that if "the 'worst case scenario' for a certain activity is serious enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to stop it taking place."
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Safe and Sorry?
The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are unobjectionable and important. Every day, individuals and nations take steps to avoid hazards that are far from certain. We do not walk in moderately dangerous areas at night; we exercise; we buy smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty foods (or carbohydrates ignore a mortality risk of 1/500,000, because that risk is quite small, but if 100 million citizens face that risk, the nation had better take it seriously. With respect to the weak version of the Precautionary Principle, there are significant cross-cultural variations; but no serious person rejects that version.
For the moment let us understand the principle in a strong way, to suggest that regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high. To avoid absurdity, the idea of "possible risk" will be understood to require a certain threshold of scientific plausibility. To support regulation, no one thinks that it is enough if someone, somewhere, urges that a risk is worth taking seriously. But under the Precautionary Principle as I shall understand it, the threshold burden is minimal, and once it is met, there is something like a presumption in favor of regulatory controls. This version, as we shall see, helps to clarify a significant problem with the idea of precaution, and also to illuminate the existence of cross-national differences.
Why the Precautionary Principle Is Paralyzing
Why might the Precautionary Principle, understood in its strong sense, have such widespread appeal? At first glance, the answer is simple, for the principle contains some important truth. Certainly we should acknowledge that a small probability (say, 1 in 25,000) of a serious harm (say, 1,000,000 deaths) deserves extremely serious attention. It is worthwhile to spend a lot of money to eliminate that risk. An economically oriented critic might observe that our resources are limited and that if we spend large amounts of resources on highly speculative harms, we will not be allocating those resources wisely.
In fact this is the simplest criticism of the Precautionary Principle. 19 If we take costly steps to address all risks, however improbable they are, we will quickly impoverish ourselves. On this view, the Precautionary Principle "would make for a dim future." 20 It would also eliminate technologies and strategies that make human lives easier, more convenient, healthier, and longer.
But there is something both odd and revealing about these claims. The
Precautionary Principle is designed to decrease morbidity and mortality; how could it possibly make the future "dim"? I suggest that the real problem with the principle is that it offers no guidance-not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including regulation. Taken seriously, it bans the very steps that it requires. To understand the difficulty, it will be useful to anchor the discussion in some concrete problems:
1. Genetic modification of food has become a widespread practice. 21 The risks of that practice are not known with any precision. Some people fear that genetic modification will result in serious ecological harm and large risks to human health;
others believe that genetic modification will result in more nutritious food and significant improvements in human health.
2. Scientists are not in accord about the dangers associated with global warming, 22 but there is general agreement that global warming is in fact occurring. It is possible that global warming will produce, by 2100, a mean temperature increase of 4.5 degrees C (the high-end estimate of the International Panel on Climate Change); that it will result in $5 trillion or more in monetized costs; and that it will also produce a significant number of deaths from malaria. The Kyoto Protocol would require most industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 92%-94% of 1990 levels. A great deal of work suggests that significant decreases in such emissions would have large benefits; but skeptics contend that the costs of such decreases would reduce the well-being of millions of people, especially the poorest members of society.
3. Many people fear nuclear power, on the ground that nuclear power plants create various health and safety risks, including some possibility of catastrophe. But if a nation does not rely on nuclear power, it might well rely instead on fossil fuels, and in particular on coal-fired power plants. It is tempting to say, as is in fact standard, that the principle calls for strong controls on genetic engineering of food, on greenhouse gases, on arsenic, and on nuclear power. In all of these cases, there is a possibility of serious harms, and no authoritative scientific evidence demonstrates that the possibility is close to zero. If the burden of proof is on the proponent of the activity or processes in question, the Precautionary Principle would seem to impose a burden of proof that cannot be met. Put to one side the question whether the Precautionary Principle, understood to compel stringent regulation in these cases, is sensible. Let us ask a more fundamental question: Is that more stringent regulation therefore compelled by the Precautionary Principle?
The answer is that it is not. In some of these cases, it should be easy to see that in its own way, stringent regulation would actually run afoul of the Precautionary Principle.
The simplest reason is that such regulation might well deprive society of significant benefits, and hence produce serious harms that would otherwise not occur. In some cases, 23 radiation, on the ground that precautionary responses are likely to cause fear that outweighs any health benefits from those responses. 26 Or consider a more general question about how to handle low-level toxic agents, including carcinogens. Do such agents cause adverse effects? If we lack clear evidence, it might seem "precautionary" to assume that they do, and hence to assume, in the face of uncertainty, that the dose-response curve is linear and without safe thresholds. 27 In the United States, this is the default assumption of the Environmental Protection Agency. But is this approach unambiguously precautionary? Considerable evidence suggests that many toxic agents that are harmful at high levels are actually beneficial at low levels. 28 Thus "hormesis" is a dose-response relationship in which low doses stimulate desirable effects and high doses inhibit them. When hormesis is involved, government use of a linear dose-response curve, assuming no safe thresholds, will actually cause mortality and morbidity effects. Which default approach to the dose-response curve is precautionary?
To raise this question is not to take any stand on whether some, many, or all toxic agents are beneficial or instead harmful at very low doses. It is only to say that the simultaneous possibility of benefits at low levels and of harms at low levels makes the Precautionary Principle paralyzing. The principle requires use of a linear, non-threshold model; but it simultaneously condemns use of that very model. For this and other reasons, unreflective use of the Precautionary Principle, it has been argued, threatens to increase rather than decrease the risks associated with food. 29 Or consider the case of genetic modification of food. Many people believe that a failure to allow genetic modification might well result in numerous deaths, and a small probability of many more. The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise of producing food that is both cheaper and healthier-resulting, for example, in "golden 26 Id. rice," which might have large benefits in developing countries. My point is not that genetic modification will likely have those benefits, or that the benefits of genetic modification outweigh the risks. The claim is only that if the Precautionary Principle is taken literally, it is offended by regulation as well as by nonregulation.
The example suggests that regulation sometimes violates the Precautionary Principle because it gives rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that materialize, or are increased, as a result of regulation. 30 Consider the case of DDT, often banned or regulated in the interest of reducing risks to birds and human beings. The problem with such bans is that in poor nations, they eliminate what appears to be the most effective way of combating malaria-and thus significantly undermine public health. 31 Or consider the United States Environmental Protection Agency's effort to ban asbestos, 32 a ban that might well seem justified or even compelled by the Precautionary Principle. The difficulty, from the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also carry risks. The problem is pervasive. In the case of arsenic, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency expressed concern that aggressive regulation, by virtue of its cost, will lead people to cease using local water systems and to rely on private wells, which have high levels of contamination. 33 If this is so, stringent arsenic regulation violates the Precautionary Principle no less than less stringent regulation does. This is a common situation, for opportunity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the exception. 34 Note also that some regulation will have ancillary benefits, by reducing risks other than those that are specifically targeted. It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health. 35 It has been urged that a statistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7 million 36 ; one study suggests that an expenditure of $15 million produces a loss of life. 37 Another suggests that poor people are especially vulnerable to this effect-that a regulation that reduces wealth for the poorest 20% of the population will have twice as large a mortality effect as a regulation that reduces wealth for the wealthiest 20%. 38 To be sure, both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are disputed. 39 41 In the early twenty-first century, for example, the United States appears to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with abandoned hazardous waste dumps and terrorism, but not to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with global warming, indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and obesity. It would be most valuable to attempt to see which nations are especially precautionary with respect to which risks, and also to explore changes over time.
A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal Environmental
Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two separate camps in the industrialized world: "precaution countries" (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States) and "protection countries" (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom). 42 But this conclusion seems to me ludicrously implausible. The universe of risks is far too large to permit categorizations of this kind. The most general point is that no nation is precautionary in general and costly precautions are inevitably taken against only those hazards that seem especially salient or insistent. 43 The problem with the Precautionary Principle is that it wrongly suggests that nations can and should adopt a general form of risk aversion. It is well-established that in thinking about risks, people rely on certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry. 44 Heuristics typically work through a process of "attribute substitution," in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one. 45 Should we be fearful of nuclear power, terrorism, abduction of young children, mad cow disease, contaminated blood, or pesticides? When people use the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether examples can readily come to mind. 46 If people can easily think of such examples, they are far more likely to be frightened than if they cannot. The availability heuristic illuminates the operation of the Precautionary Principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and why others will be neglected. The availability heuristic also tells us a great deal about differences in risk perceptions across groups, cultures, and even nations.
The Availability Heuristic
For example, "a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable." 47 Consider a simple study showing people a list of well-known people of both sexes, and asking them whether the list contains more names of women or more names of men. In lists in which the men were especially famous, people thought that they were more names of men, whereas in lists in which the women were the more famous, people thought that there were more names of women. 47 Id. at 11. 48 Id.
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism, will be seen as more serious than a risk that is less familiar, like that associated with sun-bathing. But salience is important as well. "For example, the impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper." 49 So too, recent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones. The point helps explain differences across time and space in much risk-related behavior, including decisions to take precautions. Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences. 50 If floods have not occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood plains are far less likely to purchase insurance. In the aftermath of an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply-but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede. Note that the use of the availability heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irrational. 51 Both insurance and precautionary measures can be expensive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be the best available guide to what will happen again. The problem is that the availability heuristic can lead to serious errors, in terms of both excessive fear and neglect.
What, in particular, produces availability? An intriguing essay attempts to test the effects of ease of imagery on perceived judgments of risk. 52 The study asked subjects to read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B) that "was becoming increasingly prevalent" on the local campus. In one condition, the symptoms were concrete and easy to imagineinvolving muscle aches, low energy, and frequent severe headaches. In another condition, the symptoms were vague and hard to imagine, involving an inflamed liver, a 49 Id. . 51 Kahneman and Tversky emphasize that the heuristics they identify "are highly economical and usually effective," but also that they "lead to systematic and predictable errors. malfunctioning nervous system, and a general sense of disorientation. Subjects in both conditions were asked to imagine a three-week period in which they had the disease and to write a detailed description of what they imagined. After doing so, subjects were asked to assess, on a ten-point scale, their likelihood of contracting the disease. The basic finding was that likelihood judgments were very different in the two conditions, with easily-imagined symptoms making people far more inclined to believe that they were likely to get the disease.
The availability heuristic helps to explains the operation of the Precautionary
Principle and cross-national differences for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is cognitively available, whereas other risks, including those associated with regulation itself, are not. In many cases where the Precautionary Principle seems to offer guidance, the reason is that some of the relevant risks are available while others are barely visible. And if one nation is concerned with the risk of sunbathing and another is not, availability is likely to provide a large part of the reason. This, then, is my central hypothesis: Differences across nations, in the perception of risks, have a great deal to do with the operation of the availability heuristic.
To be sure, those differences are also motivated in large part by actual differences in risk levels. Fortunately, reality matters. Nations suffering from high levels of malaria are likely to perceive malaria risks as far greater than nations in which malaria is not a problem. Countries that face serious risks from contaminated blood will probably show greater fear of contaminated blood than countries in which contaminated blood is not a problem. But availability produces differences in perceptions that do not track differences in reality.
The study of cross-cultural risk perceptions remains in its infancy, 53 1. Within the United States, public concern about risks usually does track changes in the actual fluctuations in those risks. But public concern outruns actual fluctuations in the important case of "panics," bred by vivid illustrations that do not reflect changes in levels of danger. 54 At certain points in the 1970s and 1980s, there were extreme leaps in concern about teenage suicides, herpes, illegitimacy, and AIDS-leaps that did not correspond to changes in the size of the problem.
Availability, produced by "a particularly vivid case or new finding that receives considerable media attention," played a major role in those leaps in public concern. 55 Sometimes the concern led to unjustified precautions, as in the behavior of some parents who refused to allow their children to attend classes having students with signs of herpes.
2. Availability helps to explain the findings of a cross-national study of perceptions of risk associated with terrorism and SARS. 56 In that study, Americans perceived terrorism to be a far greater threat, to themselves and to others, than SARS;
Canadians perceived SARS to be a greater threat, to themselves and to others, The availability heuristic helps to account for these cross-national differences and for the generally exaggerated risk perceptions. In the United States, risks of terrorism have (to say the least) received a great deal of attention, producing a continuing sense of threat. But there have been no incidents of SARS, and the media coverage has been limited to events elsewhere-producing a degree of salience, but far lower than that associated with terrorism. In Canada, the opposite is the case. The high degree of public discussion of SARS cases, accompanied by readily available instances, produced an inflated sense of the numberssufficiently inflated to exceed the same numbers from terrorism (certainly a salient risk in Canada, as in most nations post 9/11).
What accounts for people's perception of their risk of being infected with HIV?
Why are some people and some groups largely unconcerned about that risk, while other people and groups are highly focused on with it? A study of rural Kenya and
Malawi suggests that availability plays a critical role. 57 The authors find that risk perception is a product of discussions that "are often provoked by observing or hearing about an illness or death." 58 People "know in the abstract how HIV is transmitted and how it can be prevented," but they are unclear "about the advisability and effectiveness of the changes in sexual behavior that are recommended by experts. 59 Perceptions of the risk of HIV transition are very much a function of social networks, with pronounced changes in belief and behavior resulting from interactions with other people expressing a high level of concern. The effects of social networks are thus asymmetric, with substantial effects from having "at least one network partner who is perceived to have a great deal of concern about AIDS." The authors do not refer explicitly to the availability heuristic, but their findings are compatible with the suggestion that with respect to AIDS, risk perceptions are produced by availability. 66 In the 1990s, a "wave of crises" involving food safety, above all mad cow disease, led to the deaths of about one hundred people, with especially large effects on public attitudes. 67 In a tribute to the operation of availability, the "regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude of the European public toward GM foods." 68 An additional "scandal was the apparent failure of French government officials and doctors to protect haemopholiacs from blood contaminated with AIDS" virus, in a way that had large repercussions for public opinion in France. 69 The conclusion is that differences between European and American policies are not a product of deep-rooted cultural differences, but instead have a great deal to do with "widespread public perception of regulatory failures," often based on particular, vivid, and widely salient events.
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Social Influences
Thus far my emphasis has been on individual cognition. But to say the least, the Environmentalists, in and out of government, operate in the same way, focusing public attention on potentially catastrophic harms. Well-organized private groups play a central role in activating public concern.
The question suggests the need to attend to the social and cultural dimensions of fear and risk perception. In many cases of high-visibility, low-probability dangers, such as sniper attacks, shark attacks, contaminated blood, and the kidnapping of young girls, the sources of availability are not obscure. The mass media focus on those risks; people communicate their fear and concern to one another; the widespread fact of fear and concern increases media attention; and the spiral continues until people move on. Hence the "risk of the month" syndrome, familiar in many societies, stems from the interaction between availability and social influences. Much of the time, however, what is available and salient to some is not available and salient to all. For example, many of those who 70 Id. at 580. 71 endorse the Precautionary Principle focus on cases in which the government failed to regulate some environmental harm, demanding irrefutable proof, with the consequence being widespread illness and death. To such people, the available incidents require strong precautions in the face of uncertainty. But many other people, skeptical of the Precautionary Principle, focus on cases in which the government overreacted to weak science, causing large expenditures for little gain in terms of health or safety. To such people, the available incidents justify a measure of restraint in the face of uncertainty.
Which cases will be available and to whom?
In any case people and cultures have different predispositions. These predispositions play a large role in determining which, of the numerous possibilities, is salient. If you are predisposed to be fearful of genetic modification of food, you are more likely to seek out, and to recall, incidents in which genetic modification was said to cause harm. If you are predisposed to fear electromagnetic fields, you will pay attention to apparent incidents in which electromagnetic fields have produced an elevated incidence of cancer. If you are predisposed to believe that most media scares are false or trumpedup, you will find cases in which public fears have been proved baseless. These are examples of individual predispositions, but undoubtedly cultural forces, some deep and some less so, help account for differences across nations.
Availability helps to determine beliefs, to be sure; but beliefs help to determine availability as well. Both beliefs and availability are endogenous to one another. When social and cultural forces interact with salience, to produce concern about one set of problems but not another, predispositions are crucial. It is in this sense that availability can be a product of forces that must be explained independently. But let us now turn to how availability spreads. dangerous event, which he finds to be revealing or illustrative. (The event might involve crime, terrorism, pesticides, environmental hazards, or threats to national security.)
Cascades
Andrew tells Barry, who would be inclined to see the event as not terribly informative, but who, learning Andrew's reaction, comes to believe that the event does indeed reveal a great deal, and that a serious threat exists. Carol would tend to discount the risk, but once she hears the shared opinion of Andrew and Barry, she is frightened as well. Deborah will have to have a great deal of private information to reject what has become the shared opinion of Andrew, Barry, and Carol. 73 Stylized though it is, the example shows that once several people start to take an example as probative, many people may come to be influenced by their opinion, giving rise to cascade effects. Cultural and even national differences can be explained partly in this way. infectious enthusiasm pushing certain diseases and treatments primarily because everyone else is doing the same." 75 Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy, "seem to have been adopted initially based on weak information," and extreme differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and other procedures) provide good evidence that cascades are at work. 76 Cross-cultural differences in medical practices can be explained in significant part through this route.
A distinctive feature of social cascades is that the people who participate in them are simultaneously amplifying the very social signal by which they are being influenced.
By their very participation, those who join the cascade increase its size, making it more likely that others will join too. Unfortunately, cascades can lead people in mistaken directions, with a few "early movers" spurring social fear that does not match reality. 
Group Polarization
There is a closely related phenomenon. When like-minded people deliberate with one another, they typically end up accepting a more extreme version of the views with which they began. 80 This is the process known as group polarization. Consider a few examples:
• After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid.
81
• A group of moderately profeminist women becomes more strongly profeminist after discussion.
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• After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.
83
• After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice offer more positive responses to the same question, that is, they are more likely to find white prejudice to be the source of conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.
84
• Juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce awards that are significantly higher than the awards chosen, before deliberation, by their median member. 85 Group polarization will inevitably occur in the context of perceptions of risk; and hence group polarization helps to account for cultural and even national differences. If several people fear global warming or terrorism, and speak to one another, their fear is likely to increase as a result of internal discussions. If other people believe that nuclear power is probably safe, their belief to that effect will be fortified after they speak with one another, to the point where they will believe that nuclear power is no reason for concern. If some groups seem hysterical about certain risks, and other groups treat those risks as nonexistent, group polarization is likely to be a reason. Hence group polarization provides another explanation for the different fears of groups, localities, and even nations. Internal discussions can make Berliners fearful of risks than do not bother New
Yorkers, and vice-versa; so too, the citizens of London may fear a supposed danger that does not much bother the citizens of Paris-even if the danger is not greater in the former than in the latter. has a predisposition to think that one or another risk is serious, social dynamics will lead the group to believe that the example is highly revealing. An initial predisposition toward fear is likely to be aggravated after collective deliberations. Within groups, a tendency toward fear breeds its own amplification.
Consider in this light the 2004 report of the United States Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, which contended the Central Intelligence Agency's predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it to fail to explore alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the information that it actually held. 86 Falling victim to group polarization in the particular context of fear. the agency showed a "tendency to reject information that contradicted the presumption" that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. 87 This claim is a remarkable echo of one that followed the 2003 investigation of failures at NASA, in which the Columbia Accident Investigation Board explicitly attributed the accident to NASA's unfortunate culture, one that does too little to elicit 86 Available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/. 87 Id. at 6. information. In the Board's words, NASA lacks "checks and balances" 88 and pressures people to follow a "party line." 89 The result was a process of polarization that led to a dismissal of serious risks.
Media, Interest Groups, and Politicians
It should be clear that in the real world, some voices are more important than others, especially when availability and salience are involved. In particular, the behavior and preoccupations of the media play a large role. Many perceived "epidemics" are in reality no such thing, but instead a product of media coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents. Attention to those incidents is likely to ensure availability and salience, promoting an inaccurately high estimate of probability and at the same time some degree of probability neglect. And in the face of close media attention, the demand for legal responses will be significantly affected. Changes within and even across nations are a natural result.
Knowing the importance of media coverage, well-organized private groups work extremely hard to promote public attention to particular risks. Some of these groups are altruistic; others are entirely self-interested. The common tactic is to publicize an incident that might trigger both availability and salience. Terrorists themselves are the most extreme and vicious example, using high-visibility attacks to convince people that "they cannot be safe anywhere." But many illustrations are less objectionable and sometimes even benign. In the United States, consider the abandoned hazardous waste at Love Canal, used to promote hazardous waste cleanup, or the Exxon Valdez disaster, used by the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations to promote more stringent safeguards against oil spills. Showing at least a working knowledge of the availability heuristic, private groups seize on selected incidents and publicize them to make them generally salient to the public. In all of these examples, the use of particular instances might be necessary to move the public, and legislatures, in the right directions. Certainly the social processes that interact with salience and availability can promote reform where it is needed. But there is no assurance here, particularly if social influences are leading people to exaggerate a problem, or to ignore the question of probability altogether. there is no doubt that the salience of these attacks played a large role in affecting political behavior-and that this role cannot be understood without reference to social influences.
The implications for cultural differences should be clear. If leaders in different nations draw attention to different risks, there will be large-scale differences in risk perceptions.
Predispositions and Culture
But all this does not provide the full picture. Beliefs and orientations are a product of availability, and social influences ensure both availability and salience. But as I have suggested, what is available is also a product of antecedent beliefs and orientations, both individual and social. In other words, availability is endogenous to, or a product of, predispositions, individual, cultural, and national. A great deal of further work remains to be done on this topic. 90 Why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in which a failure to take precautions led to serious environmental harm? A likely reason is that they are predisposed to favor environmental protection. And why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in which environmental protection led to huge costs for little gain? A likely reason is that they are predisposed to oppose environmental controls. Here is an interaction between the availability heuristic and confirmation bias-"the tendency to seek information to confirm our original hypotheses and beliefs," 91 a tendency that reviewers have found in the judgments, referred to above, of both the Central Intelligence Agency and NASA. Confirmation bias plays a large role in different risk perceptions across individuals and groups. If members of a culturally distinct group are predisposed to believe that new technologies are risky, or that genetically modified organisms are hazardous, or that cell phones produce cancer, apparently supportive illustrations will be memorable, and contrary ones will be discounted.
Of course predispositions are not a black box, and they do not come from the sky.
They have sources. Among their sources are availability and salience. After incidents of mad cow disease in England, many Europeans lost trust in the relevant authorities and acquired a predisposition to fear, and to take and urge precautions against, associated and analogous threats. In Europe, the growth of precautionary thinking, across certain domains, had a great deal to do with particular salient incidents. 92 Hence there is complex set of interactions, with heuristics helping to constitute predispositions, which are in turn responsible for the real-world operation of heuristics. All this happens socially, not merely individually; and predispositions are not static. When people are in a group that is predisposed in a particular direction, the salient examples will be quite different from those that are salient in a group with an opposite predisposition. Here group polarization is especially important. What is sometimes described as "culture," or as "deep-rooted cultural differences," may be no such thing. is available and also moving predispositions in one or another direction. The problem is that both individuals and societies may be fearful of nonexistent or trivial risks-and simultaneously neglect real dangers.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have ventured a conceptual claim and a psychological hypothesis.
The conceptual claim is that it is not possible to be "precautionary" in general. An individual or a nation can take precautions against particular risks, to be sure, but no individual or nation can be precautionary as a general proposition. The reason is that risks are on all sides of social situations. If a person or state purports to be precautionary, it is almost certainly taking steps that create risks of their own. The point certainly holds for aggressive regulation of genetic modification of food and greenhouse gases; it holds as well for preemptive wars.
The psychological hypothesis is that the operation of the Precautionary Principle, and differences in risk perception among nations, have a great deal to do with the availability heuristic. If people can think of cases in which a risk has come to fruition, they are far more likely to think that the risk should be taken seriously. "Availability bias," in the form of excessive fear, and "unavailability bias," in the form of unjustified neglect, are unfortunate results. All cultures suffer from both of these. But they suffer from them in different ways, because what is available in one culture is often less available, or unavailable, in others.
Of course availability is a product of social influences. Cascade effects and group polarization play substantial roles in making one or another incident available to many or most. There are multiple equilibria here: It is hardly inevitable that SARS would have great salience in Canada but not in the United States. Single incidents and small shocks can make an extraordinary difference. Moreover, what is available to some will not be available to all, in part because of social influences, and in part because of individual, cultural, and national predispositions. Hence I have emphasized that some cultures will find some risks "available" not because of simple facts, but because the relevant citizens are predisposed to focus on some risks but not on others.
I believe that the availability heuristic provides many clues about the operation of the Precautionary Principle and cross-cultural risk perceptions. But a great deal of empirical work remains to be done, not least in exploring the complex interactions among individual cognition, cascade effects, the behavior of those who spread information, and cultural predispositions. 
